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new projects tell us we are missing  
Abstract  
This research responds to issues identified with the forecasting of operational expenditure by 
providing an in-depth analysis of a multi-modal transportation programme from New Zealand.  It 
shows material issues that are likely to be of relevance to wider infrastructure practice.  It also 
indicates that management tools and processes can inadvertently result in budgetary and 
operational omissions.  Significantly, those omissions include the very service, societal, and 
environmental requirements upon which the programme was predicated, and also omitted 
provisions for the long-term maintenance of major assets (such as bridges and other structures).  A 
more holistic model is therefore proposed to support a re-orienting of practice towards an 
integrated whole-of-system approach. 
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Introduction 
Auckland is New Zealand’s largest city of approximately 1.4 million people (Statistics New Zealand, 
2013).  Seven local councils within the 4,938km2 region were recently amalgamated with regional 
government to form a ‘super city’ ("Local Government (Auckland Council) Act," 2009).  Several 
Council Controlled Organisations were also established at that time, including Auckland Transport, 
which as its names suggests, is responsible for transportation management in the region (excepting 
the State highway network), and is the subsequent focus of this paper.   
This paper is presented in New Zealand dollars, since those are the units of the source material.  At 
the time of writing, NZD$1 equalled approximately USD$0.73 or GBP£0.55. 
Auckland Transport’s strategic documents identify an estimated NZ$60 billion of capital investment 
over the next three decades (Auckland Transport, 2013a, p. 1); with the short term annual capital 
works budget between approximately NZ$600 and NZ$650 million excluding renewals (Auckland 
Transport, 2014b, p. 26).  NZ$1.86 billion over the next 10 years has been provided for “network 
maintenance and asset operations”.  In this context, this means the maintenance of the local road 
network, and transport-related assets such as public transport facilities and commuter rail depots 
and rolling stock, but excludes the provision of transportation services, or maintenance of the wider 
rail and State highway networks.  Notwithstanding any limitations with the current approach to 
estimating operational expenditure (OPEX), this excludes growth, the current renewals programme, 
and the “increased requirement for maintenance that will arise from the reduced level of renewal 
investment from 2019 onwards” (Auckland Transport, 2015b).  Auckland Transport estimates the 
additional 1.5% of asset growth will result in an annual increase in operating expenditure (or 
‘consequential OPEX’) of some NZ$2 million, bringing the total OPEX to NZ$119 million over a ten 
year period — just to stay apace of the growth in assets (Auckland Transport, 2015b).  Yet (emphasis 
added): 
“Historically, there has been little, if any, coupling between the capital development 
programme and the increases to maintenance and operational costs.  [Capital expenditure 
(CAPEX)] and [Operational Expenditure (OPEX)] budgets are mainly viewed and managed in 
isolation.  There is little visibility or reporting around the consequential OPEX implications 
of capital development at a board or executive leadership level.  
Whilst operational budgets have been increased to allow for growth, this has largely been on 
the basis of a simple percentage uplift.  Historically this has been in the range 0.8% to 2.5% 
[of the existing operational budget], with the level mainly influenced by budget pressures or 
linked to population increase.  
This formulaic approach does not accurately reflect the increasing pressure on operational 
and maintenance budgets arising from: 
1. The growing influence of amenity and urban design considerations in infrastructure 
design 
2. The increasing use of non-standard materials and fittings  
3. Increasing network complexity and interrelationships.”  (Auckland Transport, 2014a) 
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Not surprisingly, Auckland Council (Auckland Transport’s sole shareholder) also considers the impact 
of ‘consequential OPEX’ to be a key issue at this time (Auckland Council, 2012).  And Auckland is not 
alone.  As part of a review of all New Zealand local authorities’ audited financial statements and the 
long-term plans and asset management information for 31 local authorities, the Controller and 
Auditor-General (2014a), found that:  
“When local authorities forecast their spending, they typically base their forecasts on 
assumptions about … [amongst other things, the] consequential effects on operating 
expenditure of the forecast capital additions”. 
There is, however, a perception by some that consequential OPEX is minor, and so does not warrant 
detailed evaluation; in considering the drivers of local government expenditure in New Zealand, GHD 
(2007) was of the view that: 
“One would expect that for transport, capex has a small influence on opex because usually a 
capex project is a relatively small part of an extensive transport network and opex costs 
occur 10-15 years later – apart from debt servicing”.  
Yet such issues are not limited to the New Zealand local government or transportation sectors.  For 
example, Blom and Guthrie (2016) found the underlying operational system rarely adjusts to 
accommodate changes arising from the delivery of a new project (e.g. changes to maintenance or 
other specifications/contracts and/or delivery of additional projects or changes to assets or 
services).  
The Green Book (HM Treasury, 2011) also observes that: 
“Many project parameters are affected by optimism – appraisers tend to overstate benefits, 
and understate timings and costs, both capital and operational.” 
However, optimism bias (as it is known) is a slightly different matter from the focus here, as it relates 
to project and investment decision-making in the first instance.  The cited incidence of OPEX 
underestimating (HM Treasury, 2011)), coupled with the use of consequential OPEX forecasts 
(Controller and Auditor-General, 2014a), suggests that the handover of operational schedules 
prepared during the project delivery stage is not occurring and/or these are not being used by, or 
have relevance to, the operational division(s) of an infrastructure organisation. 
This research responds to this problem by providing an in-depth analysis of the ‘consequential OPEX’ 
of a complex, multi-modal transportation programme from New Zealand.  Rather than the usual 
project or asset management approaches, the research instead adopts a whole-of-organisation, and 
system-oriented perspective.  Interviews spanning multiple infrastructure sectors and countries 
were also used to augment the research and test its broader applicability.  The focus of the case 
study is how OPEX arising from new project CAPEX has been estimated by the operational divisions 
of an infrastructure provider, and the implications this has for long-term infrastructure outcomes. 
Definitions and current conventions 
OPEX is typically defined as, and understood to be, operational expenditure/operations expenses 
(e.g. Audit New Zealand, 2010; Greffioz, Olver, & Schirmer, 1993; Lantz, 2013; Van Themsche, 2016).  
Simply put, it includes all costs required to provide services (e.g. public transport), and to operate 
and maintain assets at defined levels of service over the long term at an asset, network, and systems 
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level.  Also included are “costs for operations personnel, materials, fuel, chemicals and energy 
consumption” (National Asset Management Support (NAMS) cited in Audit New Zealand, 2010).  
Some costs may derive from new capital expenditure (CAPEX), and this has been termed 
‘consequential OPEX’ to reflect current industry use (e.g. Auckland Council, 2012; Auckland 
Transport, 2014a; and to paraphrase, Controller and Auditor-General, 2014a).  The term has been 
adopted by infrastructure practitioners as a shorthand way of defining new project operational costs 
as a subset of the wider OPEX budget, and to distinguish the estimate from any of those prepared as 
part of project development or delivery.  
With such an all-encompassing but clear definition, it might be supposed that understanding OPEX, 
and more so consequential OPEX, is relatively straightforward.  Unfortunately this does not appear 
to be supported by either literature or industry practice.  Indeed the literature is rather sparse in 
advancing matters much beyond the generic definition.  However: 
 Greffioz et al. (1993) identify three commonly used methods for assessing OPEX for oil and gas 
production facilities: the use of multiplication factors applied to CAPEX, the use of 
spreadsheets, and “ad hoc comparisons with previously estimated or known costs for other 
similar plants”.   
 HM Treasury (2011) states that: 
“Sensitivity analysis should be used to test assumptions about operating costs and expected 
benefits. 
Adjustments should be empirically based, (e.g. using data from past projects or similar 
projects elsewhere), and adjusted for the unique characteristics of the project in hand.  Cross-
departmental guidance for generic project categories is available, and should be used in the 
absence of more specific evidence.  But if departments or agencies have a more robust 
evidence base for cost overruns and other instances of bias, this evidence should be used in 
preference.  When such information is not available, departments are encouraged to collect 
data to inform their estimates of optimism, and in the meantime use the available data that 
best fits the case in hand.” 
Asset management practice also includes consideration of operational cost as the following 
definitions demonstrate (NAMS, 2011): 
 Asset management:  “The systematic and coordinated activities and practices of an organisation 
to optimally and sustainably deliver on its objectives through the cost-effective lifecycle 
management of assets.” 
 Lifecycle cost:  “The total cost of an asset throughout its life including planning, design, 
construction, acquisition, operation, maintenance, rehabilitation and disposal costs.” 
ISO (2014a, 2014b) is less specific, with ‘lifecycle’ being simply the “stages involved in the 
management of an asset”, and noting that “the naming and number of stages and the activities 
under each stage usually varies in different industry sectors and are determined by the organisation”.  
However, similar definitions to those used by NAMS may be found in other asset management 
guidance (e.g. The Institute of Asset Management, 2008).   
Some might perceive asset management to therefore be sufficient (see also Blom & Guthrie, 2016).  
However, there are a number of issues with such an assumption: 
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 OPEX is not limited to physical infrastructure and assets; and 
 Asset management processes and tools: 
- Often have gaps in data capture and other reliability issues (Controller and Auditor-
General, 2014b, p. 30; GHD, 2015); 
- May have been developed for linear assets (such as those within a road corridor), so may 
not be suitable for non-linear and/or complex assets such as public transport facilities, 
parking, town centres, and ‘blue-green’ infrastructure such as wetland ponds and rain 
gardens (e.g. Blom, Irwin, & Rangamuwa, 2011); 
Furthermore, areas of asset management practice should not be confused with the ability (or need) 
to develop an appropriate operational budget.  Or, as noted, be misconstrued as necessarily 
providing for all organisational needs. 
Projects delivered by Auckland Transport (the subject of this study), are partially funded through a 
land transport fund administered by the New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA).  As a consequence, 
NZTA funding requirements and guidance documents are relevant to, and have an influence on 
current practice (e.g. NZTA, 2010; NZTA, 2013a, 2013b).  Unfortunately, any discussion of whole-of-
life costs and consequential OPEX is also limited, and may in fact result in perverse outcomes in 
some instances.  For example the NZTA cost estimation manual (NZTA, 2010), defines ‘whole of life’ 
as the period from project investigation and reporting through to the end of construction (and such 
an assessment was undertaken for the case study discussed later).  This is not necessarily 
inconsistent with wider practice.  ISO (2011), for example, describes lifecycle costing as a 
“methodology for systematic economic evaluation of life-cycle costs over a period of analysis, as 
defined in the agreed scope” (emphasis added).   
So whilst there may be a perception that consequential OPEX is, or should also be covered within a 
whole-of-life assessment, as this shows, a lifecycle assessment does not necessarily provide for 
everything.  There is therefore a good possibility that there will be miscommunication around the 
term ‘whole-of-life’ assessment, with the meaning ‘lost in translation’.   
Where a whole-of-life assessment is undertaken as part of a project business case or investment 
decision, any sensitivity analysis and/or long-term implications may also be obscured by the use of 
discount factors.  Yet from an operator’s perspective, discount factors do not apply — indeed OPEX 
figures need to be inflation adjusted.  As long-term expenditure is not static and needs to respond 
and adapt to an evolving asset condition, levels of service, and context, there is a need to address 
consequential OPEX for operational needs.  This requires a whole-of-organisation, and a system-
oriented approach. 
Whilst Dobbs et al. (2013, p. 7) have observed that there are significant opportunities to optimise 
infrastructure maintenance and operational practice, they do note that the first step in this is to 
assess and catalogue needs.  The New Zealand Controller and Auditor-General (2014b, p. 6) appears 
to concur: 
“Spending according to budget is only sensible and appropriate if the budget is likely to be a 
good guide of what should be spent”. 
Such a basic and perhaps obvious step of firstly understanding what is required appears not to have 
received the attention it should.  After all, “if you rely on something, you need to recognise it and 
manage it over the long term” (Controller and Auditor-General, 2014b). 
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Case study overview 
This research is part of a wider programme which investigates the relationship between the strategic 
intent and management of infrastructure systems.  Consideration was therefore given to the 
selection of both the transportation sector and the New Zealand context; this is described within 
Blom and Guthrie (2016).  As part of the initial framing of the overarching research, practitioners 
from a range of infrastructure sectors and countries were asked whether competence was a factor; 
as it would be easy to summarily dismiss issues such as those identified here for this reason.  
However, Blom and Guthrie (2016) found that it was not so simple. 
So for completeness and context, we note that although a New Zealand case study has been 
selected to research this issue, New Zealand has had a strong reputation in public sector reform 
(Hood & Peters, 2004, p. 286; Sehested, 2002, p. 1523; The World Bank, 1998, pp. 80-82, 155), and 
thence Asset Management, particularly in road infrastructure (Aikman & Doherty, 2006, pp. 4157-
4158; Federal Highways Administration, 2005; and NAMS, 2011 (which is referenced in the ISO 
55000 series, 2014)).  Preceding amalgamation, local government in the Auckland region had also 
previously contributed examples of good asset management practice to industry guidance (e.g. 
Audit New Zealand, 2010).   
Project description 
The Auckland-Manukau Eastern Transport Initiative (AMETI) is a major, multi-modal programme 
aimed at improving strategic transport links in the east of Auckland, and comprises: 
“An integrated package of improvements to all transport modes in the Panmure area, designed 
to improve the transport choices so as to reduce dependence on private car use and facilitate 
land use changes to improve the area economically, socially and environmentally.”  (Auckland 
Transport, 2013b, p. 48) 
The programme is divided into several stages.  The first of which (and the focus of this case study), 
was completed in 2014 (Figure 1).  The main components of Stage 1 (or ‘the project’) include 
(Auckland Transport, 2013b, pp. 48-49): 
 The reconstruction of two road bridges and one footbridge; 
 Construction of a covered box structure (accommodating the rail station and link road), plus an 
additional pedestrian / service vehicle bridge; 
 A local road realignment; 
 Construction of a new link road (Te Horeta Road); 
 Upgrades to an existing rail station, creation of a new rail / bus interchange, and the addition of 
new bus lanes; 
 Improvements to walking and cycling facilities; 
 Establishment of public open spaces, park and ride facilities, and environmental mitigation 
works including noise wall construction, improvements to coastal outfalls, stream ‘daylighting’, 
and the rehabilitation of a wetland lagoon (integrated with stormwater management). 
At the time this research programme commenced, AMETI was the largest programme under 
construction for Auckland Transport and one of the largest transportation projects of the region.  
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The overall (uninflated) programme capital expenditure (CAPEX) estimate is NZ$1.16 billion, and the 
Stage 1 outturn cost was approximately NZ$215 million (Auckland Transport).  The Stage 1 OPEX is 
assessed within the case study detail to follow. 
Current Auckland Transport practice 
Auckland Transport has advised that consequential OPEX is currently assessed at the ‘programme’ 
level rather than on an individual project basis, as follows (Auckland Transport, 2014a): 
1. “Identify the individual asset classes created by each project included in the capital new work 
programme. 
2. Establish the level of growth (the increase in the quantity of the asset) for each asset class 
using a representative sample of projects. 
3. Assess the annual increase for each asset class using the ratio of the value of the new assets 
being created to the aggregated replacement value for that asset class. 
4. Apply the ratio calculated to the operational budget for that asset class.” 
The organisation is aware of the shortcomings of this approach, and is working on the development 
of a more robust method.  This study is understood to be informing that process, so provides an 
example of the application of systems thinking to action research (Flood, 2010). 
Compliance context 
In Campbell, Jardine, and McGlynn (2011), legal compliance and the environment are two of five 
identified ‘hidden’ operational costs.  However this misses the point: legal compliance is mandatory.  
Costs should therefore be identifiable by association with known actions and requirements.   
Notably, in New Zealand, the Resource Management Act (RMA; 1991), provides the framework for 
the sustainable management of natural and physical resources.  The Act includes criminal liabilities 
and significant fines for offences against the Act (s.339), underlining both the compulsion and the 
significance of understanding and implementing compliance requirements.  AMETI required several 
authorisations under the RMA, which have conditions to avoid, remedy, or mitigate adverse effects, 
and which include long-term requirements. 
Methodology 
As noted, the impetus for this study derives from a wider research programme.  The first phase 
(problem definition) identified the project: operational interface as one of three key areas for 
further investigation (Blom & Guthrie, 2016).  Consequential OPEX was identified as a useful means 
of exploring this and has been able to use the earlier research to test and augment this case study; 
the methodology for which is described by Figure 2.   
The main task comprised the review of some 128 detailed project documents to enable the 
development of a consequential OPEX schedule from first principles, but with reference to existing 
contracts and the organisation’s Asset Management Plan (Auckland Transport, 2015b).  Where costs 
were available from previous estimates, these were added to the schedule.  The schedule was then 
provided to Auckland Transport to cost, and compared with other recent estimates of OPEX as well 
as a high-level comparison with other projects.   
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Although multiple parts of the organisation were involved, the schedule could only be partially 
populated.  Some costs, such as road markings, could be estimated to the nearest dollar, whereas 
the costs for areas such as compliance and structures were largely absent.  The organisation 
concluded it would need to outsource the estimating to complete the schedule.  In short, basic 
operational requirements were not readily available or understood, and this was affecting the scope 
of ongoing operational actions.   
As the consequential OPEX schedule was compiled, key issues to emerge from the project 
documentation were also noted and assessed.  The process was augmented by information derived 
from a cross-section of other transportation projects within the region as well as from a series of 
industry interviews: 
 40 semi-structured infrastructure industry interviews in New Zealand and within the European 
Union, plus a further 19 general interviews within Auckland Transport as the case study 
organisation.  These were undertaken as part of the problem definition phase of a wider 
research programme, of which this study forms a part (see Blom & Guthrie, 2016).   
 An additional 6 semi-structured interviews with staff from across Auckland Transport, including 
the Programme Director, as well as senior consultant advisors.  These were to source and clarify 
information, and to seek views on preliminary observations.   
Whilst the requirements and merits of case study research have been argued by Eisenhardt (1989), 
Flyvbjerg (2006), and Yin (2003), the choice of the AMETI case study was also considered appropriate 
in this instance for the following reasons: 
 The methodology investigates consequential OPEX from across the infrastructure lifecycle and 
across the study organisation.  This might therefore be viewed as a series of studies that look at 
a single project through different perspectives. 
 The study organisation reflects the immediate past of multiple organisations.  Using a recently 
amalgamated organisation not only effectively collates best practice; it should reduce the 
likelihood of defensive or blaming behaviours as staff may not have so much ‘ownership’ of past 
processes and projects.  The study organisation was also actively seeking to improve its practice 
in this area. 
 The assessment was able to be augmented and tested by previous industry wide research; 
providing a degree of triangulation.  
 The project: 
- Includes provisions for rail, bus, walking and cycling, freight and over-dimension 
(size/weight) vehicles, plus general traffic.  The scope includes significant structures 
(including a tunnel), public transport facilities as well as transport networks, and significant 
environmental and cultural issues.  It is therefore complex enough to enable a range of 
pan-organisational issues to be canvassed (i.e. that might not arise from a straight forward 
road widening); yet 
- Is deemed (by Auckland Transport) to be sufficiently representative of wider practice; 
- Is of sufficient magnitude (size and cost) to attract and/or demand proponents of best 
practice within both the study organisation and the wider New Zealand transportation 
sector. 
- Enables extrapolation across multiple programme stages all of which are based on that of 
Stage 1. 
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The local government reforms in this region, together with the selection of a project that was 
instigated pre-amalgamation, also provided an opportunity to explore processes without a high 
degree of lock in.    
For completeness it is noted that whilst operational revenues are important, the focus of this 
research is upon expenditure from the perspective of the day-to-day organisational operations.  The 
study therefore does not revisit the whole-of-life assessment or the benefit: cost ratio calculated as 
part of the initial programme investment decision-making.  Similarly, whilst various procurement 
options may purport to offer different operational outcomes; there is still a need to investigate this 
area — at least within the New Zealand setting — where infrastructure is largely in public ownership, 
and public-private-partnerships used selectively. 
Assessment of Consequential OPEX 
The revised schedule of consequential OPEX theoretically enabled the reassessed costs (termed the 
‘amended consequential OPEX’) to be compared with several other estimating methods (Table 1).  
These cover the generic methods outlined by Greffioz et al. (1993) and HM Treasury (2011) as 
described previously.  Indeed, the amended consequential OPEX schedule identified wide range of 
matters that other estimating techniques had failed to identify.  However, only some of these were 
able to have costs determined.  Accordingly, the amended consequential OPEX figures still exclude a 
significant number of cost items that were also missing from other estimates, such as (but not 
limited to): 
 The cost of completing the project or rectifying issues (e.g. completion of stormwater treatment 
and related amenity requirements).  These are considered to be CAPEX but remain outstanding 
costs to the organisation. 
 The incremental cost to general overheads (i.e. if the project requires less than one full time 
equivalent for any one role).  These were seen as the ‘cost of doing business’ but included a 
substantial scope and list of un-costed activities / resource requirements. 
 Variations to existing maintenance / operational contracts:  these would not be ‘seen’ within the 
estimate until retendering of the associated contract. 
 Longer term costs, particularly assets such as significant structures that have increased 
maintenance requirements and costs towards the end of their design life.  There is no current 
framework for estimating these and then accounting for the costs that will eventually be 
incurred, but which is currently outside the budgetary cycle of 3 years or the long-term 
estimating period of 30 years.   
 Costs that are too difficult to readily break down to the project level (e.g. finance, insurance) or 
to cost (e.g. the cost of changing context or technology, natural disasters, risk).  These include 
costs that could not be assessed as requirements could not be identified (e.g. because some of 
the required management plans have not been delivered), together with ongoing programmes 
to help the system evolve (such as network optimisation). 
It is important to note that this exercise has not added new requirements.  Rather it captured 
undertakings made within design reports or required within consent and other approvals related 
documents and authorisations; all of which would have been subject to sign off as part of project 
development and delivery.  However these can be ‘lost to the system’ when project records are 
archived at the end of the project delivery phase. 
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This is an important point, as comparison of schedule scope, let alone the costs, highlights a 
significant number of requirements for which costs have not been previously assessed.  Indeed 
operational personnel indicate that they were not even aware of many of the ongoing requirements.  
Although not the sole reason, there is a danger that without budgetary prompting, operational 
requirements get overlooked.  Ackoff (2006) offers an apposite observation in this regard:   
“Accounting systems in the western world only take account of errors of commission, the less 
important of the two types of error.  They take no account of errors of omission.  Therefore, 
an organization that frowns on mistakes and in which only errors of commission are 
identified, a manager only has to be concerned about doing something that should not have 
been done.  Because errors of omission are not recorded they often go unacknowledged.  If 
acknowledged, accountability for them is seldom made explicit.  In such a situation a 
manager who wants to invoke as little disapproval as possible must try to either minimize 
errors of omission or transfer to others responsibility for those he or she makes.” 
The implications of course go beyond simple accounting practice, as this affects what ‘gets done’ and 
in the case of compliance or social and environmental outcomes, what costs (and/or effects) are 
ultimately externalised.  Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl (2002) also touch on this point, but in relation to 
project delivery: 
“Project promoters and forecasters may deliberately underestimate costs in order to provide 
public officials with an incentive to cut costs and thereby to save the public’s money.  
According to this type of explanation, higher cost estimates would be an incentive for 
wasteful contractors to spend more of the taxpayer’s money.  Empirical studies have 
identified promoters and forecasters who say they underestimate costs in this manner and 
with this purpose, i.e., in order to save public money (Wachs, 1990).”   
The effect of such practice is to disincentivise the inclusion or consideration of consequential OPEX 
early within project delivery process lest this affect the business case.  The absence of feedback 
within the process (Flyvbjerg, Skamris Holm, & Buhl, 2003) is such that project managers are 
unlikely, in any event, to be held to account for any OPEX estimated during this phase. 
This exercise has shown significant adjustments need to be made to consequential OPEX estimating 
practice, and that OPEX:CAPEX ratios can be misleading.  However whilst the percentage change is 
significant, an annual increase of $1.23M over previous estimates (or even $6.23M with the new 
public transport services included) may not be seen as significant when considered in the context of 
the operating budget as a whole (approximately $186 million annually).  The ‘known’ or ‘identifiable’ 
impact of the first stage of AMETI alone, with a CAPEX of NZ$215 million is approximately 5% 
inclusive of public transport services, or if these are still to be reported in a separate budget, then by 
approximately 1%.   
However the total AMETI programme has an estimated CAPEX of NZ$1.16 billion.  Setting aside the 
additional public transport services for the time being, if the same issues are replicated across the 
remainder of the AMETI programme (which is reasonable to expect), this will have an impact on the 
Auckland Transport’s OPEX budgets by approximately 5% (even with the extensive estimating 
limitations).  However if just the Stage 1 ‘additional costs’ (see Table 1) are added to an amended 
consequential OPEX figure for the whole AMETI programme, the impact on the overall annual 
organisational OPEX is approximately 10%, and challenges the assumption that CAPEX does not 
significantly affect OPEX in transportation (GHD, 2007).  There is then an obvious question as to 
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whether similar ‘discrepancies’ exist across the organisation and other projects or programmes.  The 
organisation itself considers the AMETI to be an indicative programme and of a scale to test a large 
number of organisational processes and practice.   
Another counterpoint to the possible perception this might be an inconsequential ‘error’  is that the 
cost of actually completing all of the tasks originally proposed, thereby enabling the delivery of the 
envisaged project benefits (compliance, sound engineering, function / social / system outcome, 
reputation) – is relatively small.  The additional CAPEX to address system shortfalls by contrast is 
somewhat more significant and therefore presents an opportunity cost to the organisation.  The 
impact of opportunity cost, such as other projects not being delivered or reduced levels of service, 
has not specifically been assessed through this exercise and remains an area for further study. 
Wider implications 
The reassessment of the consequential OPEX estimate should enable improvements to the 
estimating process, by identifying firstly a need to look in further detail and secondly, some of the 
key areas requiring further attention.  This is what Argyris and Schön refer to as single loop learning 
(cited in Pahl-Wostl, Holtz, Kastens, & Knieper, 2010).  Yet the very process of developing and 
estimating the schedule has highlighted a different set of interrelated issues that underline the 
importance of looking across the infrastructure lifecycle, the wider system, and organisation.  In 
many ways, these are equally, if not more important than the ‘bottom line’ as they are not only 
likely to influence the estimate but help to identify areas where attention is needed to affect 
systemic change.   
Consideration of these issues, which have been summarised in Table 2 for necessary brevity, 
provides a further learning opportunity in which existing assumptions can be revisited within their 
existing organisational frameworks.  Argyris and Schön refer to this as ‘double loop learning’ (cited in 
Pahl-Wostl et al., 2010). 
Discussion 
Bosch, Nguyen, Maeno, and Yasui (2013, p. 118) use an iceberg analogy to describe the management 
of complex issues.  They argue that the obvious symptoms or quick fixes are only a very small part of 
the approach required and rarely offer long-term solutions.  Instead, they suggest a further three 
levels of thinking which “hardly ever comes to the surface” (Bosch et al., 2013, p. 117).  Interestingly, 
these aligned with three of the key points that warrant further discussion around this matter of 
consequential OPEX: 
 Change management (including interactions between components);  
 Controlling (mental) models; and  
 System structure. 
One further matter relates to the implications of this research for infrastructure governance and 
high-level decision making.  Governance in this context relates to the board level rather than 
political function. 
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Change management 
To again cite Bosch et al. (2013, p. 116), complex issues are unlikely to be resolved with linear 
thinking or single solution, which can be challenging for a technically based organisation.  Although 
the matter of consequential OPEX might be viewed as simply a combination of the project to 
operations handover and thence the reliability of the estimate, the range of wider issues (Table 2) 
demonstrate the reality is much more complex.  Figure 3 presents those same issues graphically, 
showing a preliminary assessment of the linkages and connectivity between the various factors.  
Whilst the handover and estimating processes might be a good place to start, attention will need to 
be given to the wider system if change is to be both effectual and enduring. 
There is of course a second dimension to the matter of change management in this context; it is one 
thing to change the existing system, it is quite another to respond to the dynamic nature of (or 
change to) that system.  This is where the conventional linear representation of the infrastructure 
lifecycle is singularly unhelpful (Figure 4).  Whilst there may be a view that projects have a life of 
their own (Flyvbjerg, 2009; Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, & Rothengatter, 2003), ultimately projects should 
respond to an operational need, which is in turn providing a societal outcome.  A systems lifecycle 
such as that proposed by Blom (2014) is perhaps more helpful in this regard (Figure 5).  The current 
penchant for ‘best for project’ also needs to urgently be refocussed at the system level and 
ultimately the end user or community.  
Whilst the wider issues of the existing system will be a good guide for managing the transition of 
projects back into the operational system, this will need to be periodically reviewed (we turn to this 
next).  Goodman and Ramanujam (2012, p. 6) have identified three matters which they suggest need 
to be addressed if change is to be effectual at the organisational level: people, organisational 
structure, and technology (taken to also mean technical change in this context).  A change matrix 
results if these are combined with the central themes identified by this research (Table 3).   
Goodman and Ramanujam (2012) caution that negative change “can result in an unintended, and 
often unacknowledged, risk: a buildup of latent errors in operations.  [Managers] must consider ways 
to enhance organizational attention and memory during and after the implementation of major 
change…”.  We would concur, but given Goodman and Ramanujam use Dekker’s definition of latent 
errors (“deviations from rules and standard operating procedures that can potentially result in 
adverse outcomes of organizational significance”(Dekker in Goodman and Ramanujam (2012))), we 
are of the opinion that this does not go far enough.  Rather, this research has indicated a need for 
there to be a continual review of processes and procedures.  We argue next that sometimes this 
needs to be more than incremental change. 
The overarching point here is that the transfer of a project into the ‘system’ creates ‘threads’ of 
action and change that need to be followed through that system, and there needs to be 
accountability for doing so.  The corollary is that all dimensions and all of the key issues within the 
matrix need to be addressed to reduce the likelihood of similar problems being encountered in the 
future.  Ongoing change, and change management will be important in an evolving system, modified 
by project delivery and changing context: 
“It is important to note that reliable performance in complex systems is complicated because 
it is a dynamic, non-event that is difficult to specify and visualize.  It is dynamic because 
safety is preserved by timely human adjustments; it is a non-event because successful 
outcomes rarely call attention to themselves.  Because reliable outcomes are constant, there 
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is nothing to pay attention to.  This can decrease vigilance, the sense of vulnerability, 
increase the propensity towards complacency and inertia and decrease the quality of 
attention across the organisation.  This can be deadly.  Although adverse outcomes, 
sometimes, occur because of performance and execution mistakes, there are flaws in that 
portrayal.  Mistakes in perception, conception and understanding lead to much greater 
harm.” Sutcliffe (2011) 
Controlling models 
It is clear that multiple departments and disciplines need to contribute to the assessment of 
consequential OPEX.  Moreover, any approach needs to be more than the summing of parts to 
provide a whole-of-organisation, whole-of-life cost.  Both Bosch et al. (2013); and Newell et al. 
(2005) observe the importance of mental or controlling models when integrating different functions, 
departments, or disciplines.  There are two areas where this research suggests that convention, and 
therefore the associated controlling (mental) models merit a review.   
Albeit that this is starting to change, the first relates to the prevalence of the project oriented mind-
set, organisational structures, and general industry practice prevalent not only within the study 
organisation, but within the wider infrastructure industry.  This has already been touched upon (see 
also Blom (2014); and Blom and Irwin (2011)).  However this is considered to be crucial for effecting 
change going forward. 
The second relates to historic context.  The current practice that surrounds project delivery and the 
estimation of consequential OPEX draws upon industry convention and organisational learning; in 
other words ‘history’.  In this instance Auckland Transport has had the opportunity to draw upon 
best practice from its ‘legacy’ council organisations.  This can result in incremental change which is, 
in many respects, a form of institutional lock-in as it gives the impression of change but does not 
fundamentally reflect on the underlying mental models.  This in turn may give rise to a sense of 
stability; something Snowden and Sutcliffe tell us is problematic (Snowden, 2003, 2005; Sutcliffe, 
2011).  The longevity of infrastructure will only serve to exacerbate this sense of stability. 
During the course of this research, several points emerged which suggest it is timely to review how 
not only the matter of consequential OPEX is approached, but the overall management of 
infrastructure: 
 Relevant information and costs were readily available for simple road-related assets, but 
significantly curtailed for complex or non-standard assets; 
 Much of Auckland Transport’s forward development programme and its overarching strategic 
objectives relate to transformation (Auckland Transport, 2013a, 2014b).  Most of the significant 
projects (and therefore expenditure) relate to complex (technical, environmental or other 
contextual matters) and/or multi-modal projects, many of which interface with other 
organisations. 
 Whilst the widespread use of prorated estimates might have been considered by infrastructure 
organisations to be appropriate, this was based upon considerable lengths of reasonably 
uniform road corridor, so variance was more likely to be absorbed within the averaging effect of 
that network. 
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 By contrast, there is not the same quantum for emerging complex assets, and therefore the 
ability to both schedule and cost in a way that adequately reflects the complexity of the asset is 
much more important than before. 
Whilst obviously an issue for the matter of consequential OPEX (i.e. cost and performance 
information for novel assets need to be gathered then used), this also raises the bigger question of 
whether current approaches to infrastructure management are still relevant and appropriate.  New 
Zealand, like many ‘new world’ or post World War countries, has undergone some 150 years of 
infrastructure growth.  Although this continues, the nature of that growth has changed.  Within 
Auckland’s transport context, the focus has shifted from simply infrastructure delivery (as a series of 
projects) to ‘transformational shifts’ notably: “Move to outstanding public transport within one 
network” (emphasis added; Auckland Transport, 2014b, p. 6).  The above points, visible at the 
consequential OPEX level, may well have the potential to inhibit Auckland Transport’s ability to meet 
its long-term objectives and strategies.  Changing the controlling models, or the way in which 
infrastructure is viewed within the organisation as a whole, will therefore be an important part of an 
organisation’s ability to change, adapt, and learn.  It would be expected that Auckland would not be 
alone in facing this issue (Blom & Guthrie, 2016). 
System structure 
Although the definition of OPEX is very simple and all encompassing, it was apparent from this 
research that at a practical level, it is not managed as such; accountability for a figure rests with one 
part of the organisation, but this does not include other contributing costs such as from public 
transport services.  However, even if collated, this is still the sum of parts, and appears to be driven 
from functional reporting and data management tools rather than the actual overall costs.  The 
research identified many underlying reasons for this but significantly, arising costs did not always 
neatly fit within currently defined budgetary categories and so were omitted.  If this is not 
understood, like the example of ‘whole-of-life’ costing, this will be lost in translation, and there will 
be an expectation that OPEX figures are a holistic and all-encompassing assessment of ongoing 
operational costs. 
Currently, and in simple terms, CAPEX consists of new project expenditure and asset renewals, and 
OPEX covers maintenance, services, and asset management.  Maintenance and renewals are a 
sliding scale, so the threshold above which works are classified as OPEX or CAPEX may vary over time 
or from organisation to organisation.  The interplay between maintenance and renewals is in itself 
significant as: 
“Local authorities adopted financial strategies that included “just-in-time” responses to 
growth-related capital expenditure.  Many reduced the forecast level of renewals and took a 
“sweating the assets” approach … and adopting “run to failure” approaches – which meant 
waiting until a component stopped working before replacing it, rather than replacing a 
component before it failed”.  (Controller and Auditor-General, 2014b, p. 14) 
This has implications for how long-term maintenance and the associated budgets might be perceived 
and we return to this later. 
Aside from the completeness of the OPEX estimate itself, there were two particular areas where 
costs were being omitted from the wider organisational system, both of which require a different 
means of managing funds than the current approach: 
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 CAPEX related deferred benefits:  These are the ‘claimed’ project benefits that are not delivered 
due to scoping, specification, lack of follow through, budgetary constraints, or other reasons.  
Many relate to connectivity to a wider network such as those for bus priority, walking, and 
cycling. 
 OPEX related adaptive capacity:  This includes components that have the potential to arise over 
time such as emergency scenarios including natural disaster.  However these are also as much 
about enabling the organisation to adapt and respond to change as they are to responding to 
risk.  These include provision for technology or compliance requirements through review or 
renewal, future proofing, resilience related initiatives, and opportunistic works.   
An associated matter is level of service, which relates to delivering the whole-of-life outcomes of the 
asset such as design life or services provided.  Operational service levels can be affected by 
budgetary changes, or as seen through this research, get degraded through (for example) project 
decision-making, handover disconnects, or lack of specification.  Instead it is suggested that 
operational levels of service should be fixed relative to how they were proposed (or at least provide 
a baseline for improvement over time).  Any reduction should be related to need rather than budget 
boundaries acting as a proxy for such.  This is also linked to the ‘adaptive capacity budgets’ for 
improvements to or reorientation of levels of service.  Instead any discretion should rest within the 
CAPEX phase, how projects are specified, and in particular how investment is focused.  This is aimed 
at supporting the current strategy of doing more with existing assets, and underlining the role of 
CAPEX in transforming the system.   
Figure 6 proposes a new operational model to better provide for these factors.  This not only 
provides a place for the more significant ‘orphan’ or currently hidden costs, but provides a tension 
between short- and long-term requirements.  The approach also aims to increase transparency and 
certainty within the system. 
The final point within this section is a challenge for those within finance (as this sits outside of the 
ambit of this research).  The following issues were raised during this research, and it is clear that the 
current accounting approach is not well suited to long-term OPEX in the infrastructure sector, and 
needs to address a range of matters, including: 
 Budgetary horizons:  Long design-life infrastructure such as structures will likely have little 
routine maintenance within short to medium term budgets.  These costs do however remain and 
will enter the ‘system’ at some stage.  Currently these costs are being ‘lost in time’. 
 Discounting versus inflation adjustment:  Linked to the preceding point, because initial whole-of-
life costings are completed for funding purposes, discount rates are used (and exclude long-term 
maintenance requirements).  By contrast, inflation is applied to any ongoing OPEX figure (but it 
appears long-term costs are omitted as these were not material when assessed initially).  Early 
project and ongoing assessments of OPEX need to be undertaken from the organisation’s 
operational perspective not just for funding purposes as they are asking and answering different 
questions.  
 Non-conforming assets:  Some assets, for example travel demand measures such as the ‘walking 
school bus’ (resource cost rather than a tangible asset), or appreciating assets such as riparian 
margins and wetlands may not sit neatly within standard accounting frameworks.  Accounting 
imperative may therefore result in perverse outcomes or drivers in some instances.  
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 The use of time dependent (use it or lose it) budgets can be unhelpful in the operational 
preparation for project delivery (e.g. if project delayed), or in providing for the adaptive capacity 
of the system.  Whilst there is a tension with rating practice and issues with the establishment of 
large contingency sums, this does not seem to be well provided for at present. 
This is not to say that the system should be made unduly complicated, but rather some high-level 
changes are required to improve the system structure, and to provide better transparency and 
improved accountability for delivering strategic outcomes. 
Governance 
This research will also have implications for governance, in at least the following areas: 
 OPEX specific:  The true cost of OPEX, once known for the originally proposed levels of service, 
will have an influence on high-level strategies and decision making, and in particular the relative 
emphasis placed on maintenance, renewals, and long-term outcomes. 
 More generally:   
- Well established management tools may promulgate a sense of certainty but may include 
significant levels of uncertainty and omission.  The complexity of the contributing 
processes and organisational matters may make this difficult to ‘unpick’ when presented at 
a high level and may be masked by terminology, perspective, and expectation.   
- The dynamic and complex nature of infrastructure as a system requires change 
management and a periodic review of controlling mental models, both of which would 
benefit from governance leadership. 
Conclusions 
This research has provided useful insights at two levels.  Firstly it has provided an in-depth study of 
how consequential OPEX is estimated and managed.  This has highlighted a complex series of 
compounding issues that raise questions about veracity of consequential OPEX estimation and 
indicate that many factors are being lost in either translation or time.  Eroded levels of services may 
not be immediately apparent as they may not manifest within the system in which it is managed 
(e.g. effects are externalised to the environment or society), or may not manifest within 
conventional business timeframes (e.g. effects or implications are not realised within 40 years).  This, 
in turn, raises a second order of issues which relates to the impact this has upon long-term 
infrastructure outcomes.  It corroborates earlier research which indicated that more attention needs 
to be given to the system perspective of infrastructure and the organisations that manage it.  After 
all, this is “arguably the level relevant to, and the reality of, much of the realm of day to day public 
infrastructure management” (Blom & Guthrie, 2016). 
Whilst the research has highlighted significant underestimation of consequential OPEX, the effect on 
the bottom line is only part of the equation.  It is, perhaps, less relevant than what the study has 
shown about the wider issues within the technical-organisational realm and the context in which this 
sits.  In the very least, the study qualifies the performance management maxim: you can’t manage 
what you don’t measure…and don’t have a budget for.  It is somewhat trite, but unfortunately 
necessary to add: but first you need to know what you are both required and intending to achieve. 
There is considerable scope for additional research on this matter.  Whilst this could include 
additional case studies, and/or other infrastructure sectors, there remain auxiliary questions such as 
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what happens when assets are ‘vested’ to the public by a private developer, and whether alternative 
procurement, such as public/private partnerships necessarily address or defer the issues raised here.  
This paper also levels a challenge to those in finance to develop accounting practice that better 
facilitates and responds to the specific needs of public infrastructure governance and management.  
Finally, the research underlines the need to research the interface between engineering and 
management as it relates to infrastructure practice, but to do so with a focus upon long-term system 
outcomes. 
Public infrastructure assets are a reflection of our development legacy, and of both past 
maintenance practice and budgetary factors.  Cromwell (1991), for example, suggests that the 
dilapidated condition of infrastructure is not merely a reflection of the age of the existing capital 
stock, but rather an artefact of the compounding of project delivery oriented policy with 
bureaucratic and political pressures.  With some US$57t of global infrastructure investment needed 
between 2013-2030 (Dobbs et al., 2013), understanding the long-term commitment to operational 
expenditure, and the actions and outcomes that underpin it, is paramount.   
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Figure 1:  AMETI staging plan 
Source:  Auckland Transport (2015a) 
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Figure 2:  Methodology 
 
 
Figure 3:  Preliminary mapping of issues surrounding the assessment of consequential OPEX 
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Figure 4:  Conventional infrastructure life cycle 
Source:  Modified from Guthrie and Konaris (2012, p. 7); Lenferink, Tillema, and Arts (2008, p. 10); van der Lei, 




Figure 5:  Infrastructure systems life cycle 
Source:  Modified from Blom (2014, p. 15) 
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Tables 
 













Costs for first year of operations.  Actual costs not specifically 
tracked and not readily identifiable.  <1% of the ‘total amended 
consequential OPEX’ could be traced. 
Not available 
Prorated  $2.15M/y Current estimating method.  Assumes OPEX is a percentage of 
CAPEX.  No rate was available for the tunnel and some 
NZ$167.51M CAPEX had no OPEX in the previous ‘estimated 
consequential OPEX’ exercise.  To provide a minimum figure, the 
lesser road rate was applied to the unassessed CAPEX.*   
0% 
Estimated  $1.26M/y Recent asset led estimation.  This uses rates sourced from 
Auckland Transport, maintenance contractors, and benchmarks 
from other similar assets or facilities.   
60% 
Amended  $2.49M/y 
 
($7.49M/y) 
This study.  Excluding public transport services, most compliance 
actions, and tunnel and major structures maintenance costs. 
Including additional bus services (which are known within study 
organisation but not included in previous OPEX estimates).  
Excluding most compliance actions, and tunnel and major 






$1.06M Additional one off costs able to be readily identified.  Includes 
estimated cost of resolving archaeology, opportunity cost from 
resale of contaminated land, and emergency and operational 
training associated with the new tunnel. 
- 
*  The CAPEX:OPEX ratio arising from the estimated consequential OPEX was comparable to the ratios assumed in the prorated 
estimate.  By contrast the CAPEX:OPEX ratio arising from this exercise was typically greater (sometime significantly so).  If 
relatively minor changes were made to the prorated figures using the lower of the assessed ratios, then the recalculated 
prorated annual OPEX would be in the order of $3.1M (i.e. +40% of current/prorated and +145% of the estimated consequential 
OPEX figures).  In a study of public transport growth for Auckland, Deloitte (2013) note that the OPEX:CAPEX ratio used in their 
assessment excludes any consideration of additional public transport services to accommodate growth.  That ratio, whilst 
slightly higher than the rate used in this study for the road related assets, is significantly less than that for the stations. 
Note:  The overall accuracy of the amended consequential OPEX cannot be assessed given the scope of outstanding omissions.  
It is however considered that the amended consequential OPEX is a minimum value.  A list of the more substantive omissions 
and unknowns are given in the body of the text. 
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Table 2:  Summary of wider implications 
Issues Comments 
General processes 
Information accessibility No clear bundle of information aimed at operations.  Information archived at end 
of project delivery including compliance material.  Management systems may not 
assist as data may not be accessible or useable.  Difficult to ascertain whether all 
requirements have been captured and to track changes arising during delivery. 
Issue salience and 
summing of the parts 
 Project versus operational: ‘Best for project’ sometimes prioritised over long-
term or operational matters (e.g. poor whole-of-life design choices).  
Compounded by project delivery objectives (delivery cost, programme, 
construction safety and compliance) do not necessarily align with strategic 
objectives and system level project purpose.  Costs may therefore arise in 
delivering missing components (CAPEX & OPEX). 
 Functional focus versus systemic need:  Organisational belief systems can 
lead to assumed boundaries of accountability and belief that excluded 
matters are either dealt with elsewhere within the organisation or not the 
responsibility of the functional area.  Costs that are not OPEX but still a cost 
to the organisation (e.g. completing project actions after practical 
completion) therefore become ‘hidden’ by being absorbed.  Sum of parts 
does not equal total consequential OPEX / cost to organisation. 
 Familiar versus less defined:  Preference for scheduling assets conventionally 
found in conventional databases.  For example road marking was estimated 
to the nearest dollar and structures maintenance and renewals were absent.  
Issue with management tools becoming decision making proxies.  
Requirements (and therefore costs) were shown to be greater than the sum 
of the parts; whole-of-organisation assessment required before dividing 
accountabilities across structure or function. 
Compliance 
Integration of compliance requirements:  Largely omitted from OPEX, raising 
larger issues of risk and liability, plus potentially significant costs in completing or 
rectifying mitigation requirements.  This also has a potential impact on project 
benefits as compliance linked to social and environmental outcomes. 
Compliance also relates to the following matters, which have been integrated in 
the issues that follow: 
 The purpose of project documentation: 
 The completion of project delivery requirements; 
 Third party interfaces; and 
 Consequential operational implications. 
Strategy and project planning 
Business case and funding Business case or funding assessments of ‘whole-of-life’ is not necessarily suitable 
for calculating consequential OPEX from an operational perspective.  Meaning 
also potentially lost in translation.  Does not include maintenance or renewals 
beyond 40y horizon even though requirements for major structures (for example) 
may exponentially increase towards the end of their design life.  OPEX also not 
always included in other project scheme assessments (e.g. Maunsell/AECOM, 
2007) and attention to operations not part of industry Gateway processes until 
completion of construction (State Services Commission, 2010, 2013a, 2013b, 
2013c, 2013d, 2013e). 
Project planning and Project documentation not focused on operations and often cursory 
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approvals consideration given in documents.  Highlights the need not merely for inclusion 
of maintenance with design and consenting documents but rather a set of 
documents to be prepared specifically from the operators’ perspective.  This 
would not only facilitate handover but contribute to an improved OPEX 
assessment early within the project delivery cycle. 
Benefit management Omission of requirements may artificially lower consequential OPEX and erode 
benefits and / or levels of service.  This may not always be obvious as this may 
manifest at the ‘system’ rather than asset or project level.  Also, the effects of 
any omission may not be realised within the system that manages it (e.g. 
externalised effects on society or the environment), and / or the effects are only 
realised in the long term (e.g. shortened asset life).  Consequently OPEX related 
omissions may not be ‘seen’ within the infrastructure organisation. 
Project delivery 
Design and construction 
procurement 
Operational requirements need to be bolstered within contract documentation 
and written specially to meet the requirements of the operations teams.  This 
particularly needs to consider how the information is to be accessed and used.  
Designs need to give more than cursory consideration to maintenance (e.g. 
robust materials equates to low maintenance), and to specifying exactly which 
parts of standards and guidelines have been applied.  Consideration also needs to 
be given to organisational capability and capacity, which may also affect budgets 
ahead of project delivery. 
Project completion Additional organisational costs (may not be OPEX) are omitted and otherwise not 
directly captured.  This includes those costs associated with resolving secondary 
project consequences (e.g. archaeology), completing mitigation, completing 
other compliance requirements (e.g. monitoring).  Omissions become absorbed 
or result in consequential spend that was not anticipated. 
Deferred benefits Aligned with benefit management but relates to the reconciliation of statements 
with project assessments with the finally delivered scope.  Examples were often 
found in relation to claimed improvements to connectivity except that the 
delivered asset did not connect to a wider network.  This raises issues in relation 
to benefit: cost assessments and the ability to later justify smaller projects to ‘join 
the dots’.  This suggests there is some merit in variable project envelopes by 
mode particularly where walking, cycling, public transport envelopes might 
logically differ from general traffic. 
Operations 
Handover processes Clear need to improve handover requirements and to ensure full integration of 
the project into the operational system.  Not all requirements had been delivered 
(especially compliance requirements), or were available meaning not everything 
could be costed or understood by the operations division.  Whilst changes to the 
handover area would be an obvious first step, limiting improvements to this area 





Largely focussed on physical assets, these need to include non-standard (e.g. 
architectural features, ‘blue-green’ stormwater management), or consequential 
impacts (e.g. ongoing contaminated land or archaeological requirements) arising 
from the project.  Consideration as to how variations are managed for non-
standard items is also required around precedent, efficiencies, and organisational 




Organisational integration See also ‘issue salience and summing of parts’, above.  Significant scope but 
uncertain cost associated with incremental changes to the ‘cost of doing 
business’.  Introduces impacts on transparency, and uncertain accountability.  
Particularly noted for tasks associated with compliance, social or environmental 
outcomes, mitigation, risk, adaptation and evolution.  Whilst costs may be 
difficult to define this does not abrogate responsibility. 
Third party interfaces The case study project had a number of operational interfaces with third parties 
for areas such as rail, dam and stormwater management, parks and landscaping, 
and traffic control.  Because requirements had not been identified and included 
in a schedule, both costs and transfer requirements had not been fully 
determined.  This included issues with future performance auditing, and follow 
through.   
Programme staging The implications of delaying future stages on the benefits delivered in Stage 1, 
the need to undertake deferred maintenance or upgrade ‘temporary’ project 
interfaces was unknown.  This could add additional OPEX and also CAPEX is 
auxiliary works are required to adjust interfaces. 
 
 
Table 3:  Change matrix 







General processes    
Strategy and project planning    
Project delivery    
Operations    
Organisational interfaces    
* Note:  Key issues sourced from Table 2.  Sub-issues should be identified on an organisation and / or project specific basis, 
but those identified within Table 2 may provide a useful starting point.   
 
 
